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login class w/ extended openfiles' (#559) from oxzi/snac2:openbsd-openfiles-nfiles into master
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/559
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A file heavy applications makes heavy use of files. Shocking news.
OpenBSD's daemon login class limits the amount of openfiles quite
strict. This restriction is an annoyance for lots of applications, and,
unless I am mistaken, seems to be an issue for snac as well.
Thus, after hopefully fixing this on my instance, I tried to briefly
document this in snac(8) and provide a minimal login.conf(5) example.
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So far, it was expected that xs_socket_accept should work and while its
failure results in a termination, it was not properly logged. With this
change, an error message including the strerror message is being logged.
After experiencing some unexpected snac httpd shutdowns, I added a bit
of additional logging, including when xs_socket_accept fails. This
proved useful, as it unveiled a deeper error on my machine:
> xs_socket_accept failed: Too many open files
Since entering this code path results in termination, I thought
upstreaming this logging might be useful for others.
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mookie/snac2:master into master
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/557
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from ag-eitilt/snac2:mastoapi/credentials-uri into master
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/555
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Mastodon split the field out from `url` for identification purposes in
version 4.2.0, leaving the previous for simply navigating to the user
page. Some services (notably Bridgy Fed) rely on the `uri` as part of
their OAuth flow: https://github.com/snarfed/bridgy-fed/issues/2339
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daltux/snac2:pt_BR-9 into master
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/554
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Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/553
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New strings (abbreviated months) translated.
Fix notification filter list parallelism.
Fix clear meaning of a button.
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store + Prevent voting when not allowed' (#552) from davidrv00/snac2-fork:vote-fix into master
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/552
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davidrv00/snac2-fork:poll-mastoapi into master
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/551
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(#549) from oxzi/snac2:strip-metadata-man-warning into master
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/549
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oxzi/snac2:strip-metadata-openbsd into master
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/548
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Add words of caution and reasoning to the "strip_exif" configuration for
the server.json file, as these commands would be executed outside of the
sandbox - at least on OpenBSD - and both have quite a history on
security issues due to their huge attack surface and variety of
supported protocols.
After getting comfortable with the related code, I would continue using
it on a personal instance, but would reconsider enabling "strip_exif" on
shared instances with multiple users.
IMO, snac administrators should at least know of potential dangers.
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Change the strip_exif logic to work with the already existing OpenBSD
sandbox and allow ffmpeg and mogrify to be executed.
The previous strip_exif implementation relied on system(3), effectively
starting "/bin/sh" and executing the required tool within a shell
session. Making this work in the sandbox would require to allow
executing "/bin/sh", rendering the sandbox useless.
Thus, the code now starts determining the absolute path of the tools -
unless they are given as ffmpeg_path or mogrify_path - and allowing them
to be executed via unveil(2). Then, instead of the system(3) call, the
good old fork(2) and execve(2) dance is performed.
The sbox_enter code was made aware of strip_exif, which resulted in a
pledge(2) violation before when disable_email_notifications was set to
false. Furthermore, the detected paths of the tools are now allowed.
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Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/grunfink/snac2/pulls/546
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